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Abstract
Security protocols make use of cryptographic techniques to achieve goals such as confidentiality, authentication and in-
tegrity. However, the fact that strong cryptographic algorithms exist does not guarantee the security of a communications
system. In fact, it is recognised that the engineering of security protocols is a challenging task, since protocols that appear
secure can contain subtle flaws that attackers can exploit. A number of techniques exist for the analysis of security protocol
specifications. Individually they are not capable of detecting every possible flaw or attack against a protocol. However,
when combined, these techniques all complement each other, allowing a protocol engineer to obtain a more accurate
overview of the security of a protocol that is being designed. This is the rationale for multi-dimensional security protocol
engineering, a concept introduced by previous projects of ours over several years. We propose an attack construction ap-
proach to security protocol analysis within a multi-dimensional context. This analysis method complements the existing
inference construction analysis tools developed earlier in the group. We give a brief overview of the concepts associated
with the project, including a summary of existing security protocol analysis techniques, and a description of the strand
space model, which is the intended formalism for the analysis.
Keywords: Security protocols, cryptographic protocols, analysis, strand space model
Computing Review Categories: C.2.0, C.2.2, D.2.4
1 Introduction
Network security protocols make use of cryptographic
techniques to achieve goals such as confidentiality, authen-
tication, integrity and non-repudiation. However, the fact
that strong cryptographic algorithms exist does not guar-
antee the security of a communications system [29]. In
fact, it is recognised that the engineering of security proto-
cols is a very challenging task, since protocols that appear
secure can contain subtle flaws and vulnerabilities that at-
tackers can exploit [2]. A number of techniques exist for
the analysis of security protocol specifications. Each of the
techniques currently available is not capable of detecting
every possible flaw or attack against a protocol when used
in isolation. However, when combined, they complement
each other and allow a protocol engineer to obtain a more
accurate overview of the security of a protocol that is be-
ing designed [14]. Previous projects of ours, in particular
the Security Protocol Engineering and Analysis Resource
(SPEAR) [3], and its successor, SPEAR II [27], introduced
the concept of multi-dimensional security protocol engi-
neering. Several aspects of cryptographic protocol engi-
neering are collected into one application, which allows
an engineer to rapidly construct, analyse and implement
secure protocol designs. The aspect of security protocol
analysis in these projects was based on the inference con-
struction techniques BAN [6] and GNY [11] modal logics
respectively.
In this paper, we propose an automated attack con-
struction analysis of security protocols within a multi-
dimensional context. The primary focus of the investiga-
tion area covered here, is on techniques for effective au-
tomatic searches for possible attacks – in form of secrecy
and authentication violations – against the protocol. The
other area of study during this phase of our security pro-
tocol engineering research, is to investigate the relation-
ship between inference construction and attack construc-
tion methodologies in order to facilitate combination of
these in a unified environment such as SPEAR II. The
method of our choice for formal description of security
protocols is based on the so-called strand space model, in-
troduced by Thayer Fa´brega, Herzog and Guttman [33].
The aims of this paper are:
• to position our proposed research in the context of
multi-dimensional security protocol engineering in gen-
eral and the SPEAR II project in particular,
• to give a brief overview of the existing security proto-
col analysis techniques in order to put attack construc-
tion in context, and
• to present the strand space model, which is the formal-
ism on which we will build the protocol analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, multi-dimensional security protocol engineer-
ing is described, with a summary of the SPEAR II project.
A brief overview of existing protocol analysis techniques
is given Section 3, after which the strand space model is
presented in Section 4. Finally, the paper is concluded in
Section 5.
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2 Multi-Dimensional Security Proto-
col Engineering
Specialised tool support for formal methods can signifi-
cantly aid protocol engineers in creating and implement-
ing cryptographic protocols that achieve their goals, do not
leak information, and are immune to attacks. In fact, proto-
col design and analysis has become so advanced and com-
plex that we cannot perform certain analyses by hand as
they take too long and tend to become tedious and error-
prone over time. It has been shown that each of the avail-
able techniques is not capable of cutting out every pos-
sible flaw in a protocol when used on its own [14]. On
the other hand, when used in combination, they comple-
ment each other, resulting in a more secure implementa-
tion. This multi-dimensional approach combines a number
of engineering dimensions into one application, aiding the
construction, analysis and implementation of protocols. In
addition, the SPEAR philosophy aims to facilitate crypto-
graphic protocol engineering and aid users in focussing on
the critical issues by presenting them with an appropriate
level of detail, and by guiding them as much aspects of se-
curity protocol engineering in a user-friendly environment
will assist in producing more secure cryptographic proto-
cols.
2.1 The SPEAR II Tool
A schematic overview of the SPEAR II framework is given
in Figure 1. Completed modules within the framework are
indicated by solid outlines, while possible future additions
are denoted by grey outlines. This software engineering
view of the tool is an intuitive representation that shows
some relationships between its components, but it also in-
dicates how the tool is used. In the figure, the large ar-
rows between the modules indicate a natural work order
when developing a security protocol, and the thinner ar-
rows show what kind of information is conveyed between
the modules. The figure suggests an iterative approach
with the analysis modules feeding back results from anal-
yses to the specification environment.
2.1.1 The Current Status of SPEAR II
Currently SPEAR II consists of four components inte-
grated into one unified graphical interface:
1. The GYPSIE protocol specification environment is de-
signed for effective and accurate construction of cryp-
tographic protocols and functions as the main inter-
face of the SPEAR II application. By using three lev-
els of abstraction presented through different views,
the GYPSIE environment is able to present a protocol
engineer with an appropriate impression of a crypto-
graphic protocol and its operation.
2. GYNGER is a Prolog-based analyser that performs au-
tomatic analysis of protocols by using the GNY modal
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Figure 1: The existing components of SPEAR II with pro-
posed additions
logic [11]. The analysis engine employs a forward-
chaining approach to mechanise the tedious applica-
tion of GNY inference rules, allowing all derivable
GNY statements to be generated accurately and effi-
ciently.
3. The Visual GNY environment was created to facili-
tate GNY-based protocol analysis and works in close
conjunction with GYPSIE. In essence, Visual GNY
functions as a user-friendly interface to the GYNGER
analyser. To use the Visual GNY environment, users
do not need to know the details of the GNY syntax
and notation. However, they must be familiar with the
semantics and concepts underlying the logic to use it
effectively.
4. A message rounds calculator (not shown) receives a
protocol specification from GYPSIE and returns the
messages that can be sent together in parallel, which
ensures that the most efficient protocol design in terms
of message rounds can be deployed at the implemen-
tation stage.
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2.1.2 The Future of SPEAR II
In order to increase practical value of the tool, a number of
additions can be made to the SPEAR II framework. From a
software engineering perspective, a protocol requirements
tool would assist the user to obtain an initial protocol spec-
ification from a set of requirements rather than having to
define the specification from the beginning. On the other
end, an implementation generation tool would complete
the protocol engineering process. We are busy developing
such a tool as a specific related project [35]. One way of
increasing the confidence in a protocol specification is to
use external analysis tools. The Common Authentication
Protocol Specification Language (CAPSL) [21], supports
interfaces to several tools. Therefore, a CAPSL interface
would also be a useful addition to the framework.
As mentioned, the protocol analysis dimension in
SPEAR II is based on GNY logic, which is only one of
a number of available analysis techniques for security pro-
tocols. In order to increase confidence in a protocol spec-
ification, it is necessary to incorporate additional analysis
methods in the framework. Attack construction analysis,
as under consideration in this paper, complements the ex-
isting GNY inference construction module in SPEAR II.
The strand space model is an intuitive and efficient formal-
ism, with inherent properties favouring an attack construc-
tion analysis approach. The results from other work in this
area [30, 22] and our own experience of implementing a
prototype system [16], favour this approach. The remain-
der of the paper gives an overview of existing protocol
analysis techniques and a description of the strand space
model.
3 Security Protocol Analysis Tech-
niques
The available security protocol analysis techniques can be
classified in a number of ways [13, 18, 20, 10]. For our
purposes, the methods are classified as shown in Figure 2.
The three main analysis methods are ad hoc analysis, in-
ference analysis and explicit intruder model analysis.
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Figure 2: A classification of security protocol analysis
methods
3.1 Ad Hoc Analysis
Ad Hoc protocol analysis is a set of informal methods
of analysing protocol design. Many design flaws can be
avoided using this method, in fact, some protocol vulner-
abilities can only be detected with the use of ad hoc ana-
lysis. The biggest disadvantage with this approach is that
the analysis only shows that the specification is resistant
to each test performed on it. Moreover, due to its infor-
mal nature, there is no way of showing that the test itself is
complete. Ad hoc analysis can be divided into ’playing the
attacker’ and design rules and principles.
3.1.1 Playing the Attacker
This is an informal way of testing the protocol specifica-
tion (or implementation) for flaws. As the name indicates,
the tester tries to break the protocol with the help of a
checklist of previously identified protocol flaws and also
applies tests made specifically for the analysed protocol.
The method requires a great deal of experience and insight
in protocol engineering for it to be effective.
3.1.2 Design Rules and Principles
Through the history of security protocol design theory, a
number of practical design rules and principles have been
formulated to assist a protocol engineer to avoid design
flaws. In many cases these principles, if followed, are
shown to rule out attacks of a certain type against the proto-
col [12, 1, 2]. An important group of design principles are
those that deal with issues in the area between the symbolic
high-level representation of protocols, and the low-level
cryptographic operations. For example, some attacks take
advantage of properties of concatenated message compo-
nents at the bit level [25], which cannot be identified in a
formal analysis on the protocol level.
3.2 Inference Analysis
Inference analysis is a class of analyses that builds a frame-
work of modal logic around properties such as knowledge
and beliefs of the participants in a protocol. The first logic
system for protocol analysis was the so-called BAN logic
devised by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [6]. It assumes
that authentication is a function of integrity and fresh-
ness, and uses logical rules to trace both of those attributes
through the protocol. There are three main stages for the
analysis of a protocol using BAN logic. The first step is to
express the assumptions and goals as statements in a sym-
bolic notation so that the logic can proceed from a known
state to one where it can ascertain whether the goals are in
fact reached. The second step is to transform the protocol
steps into symbolic notation. Finally, a set of deduction
rules called postulates are applied. The postulates should
lead from the assumptions, via intermediate formulas, to
the authentication goals. The BAN logic has been extended
in, amongst others, GNY [11] (the analysis method used in
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SPEAR II), and SvO [31]. Inference analysis of crypto-
graphic protocol has been shown to be a success. A num-
ber of protocol flaws have been found by the use of this
technique, including Needham-Schro¨der [23] and CCITT
X.509 [7]. However, as stated previously, these methods
have limitations. One type of attack that cannot be detected
using this kind of analysis is so-called type-flaw attacks,
which take advantage of some protocols’ vulnerability to
message component substitutions.
3.3 Explicit Intruder Model Analysis
This class of analysis methods involve an explicit model
of the protocol and a model of an intruder. There are many
available formalisms that can be used to model the proto-
col, the participants, the intruder, their actions and the mes-
sages that they exchange. Examples of such formalisms is
the language used in the NRL protocol analyzer [19], the
rank functions used in CSP based analysis [28], and the
previously mentioned strand space model. All approaches
within this class use essentially the same basic assump-
tions about network communication and the capabilities of
the adversary. These assumptions are based on the model
introduced by Dolev and Yao [9], which gives the intruder
the following capabilities:
• Read any message and block further transmission
• Decompose a message into parts and remember them
• Generate fresh data as needed
• Compose a new message from known data and send it
It is worth noting here that the intruder is only capable
of obtaining encrypted information if he possesses the key
to decrypt it with. This is referred to as perfect encryption
assumption [17], which is a means of isolating the protocol
functionality from the cryptographic operations used in it.
There are two different methods of using this model,
namely searching the model forwards and searching it
backwards. Tools that use a forward search start in an ini-
tial state of a protocol environment and search the state
space for insecure states exhaustively. This kind of ana-
lysis we refer to as attack construction. The backward
search, called proof construction, attempts to prove that a
given insecure state of a protocol is unreachable. Outside
the world of security protocol engineering, these meth-
ods are called model checking and theorem proving respec-
tively. The distinction is made here in order to emphasise
the fact that the forward search of a model finds an attack
against a protocol (in form of a trace), whereas a backward
search finds a proof of a specified attack being possible
against a protocol.
3.3.1 Attack Construction
As the name indicates, this method construct probable at-
tack sets based on the algebraic properties of the protocol’s
algorithms. Examples of such methods are the NRL Pro-
tocol Analyzer [19], and Lowe’s method of using the FDR
model checker [15]. These methods are targeted towards
ensuring authentication, correctness, or secrecy properties
of the analysed protocols. Their disadvantage lies in the
big number of possible events that must be examined, also
referred to the state space explosion problem. However,
various optimisation techniques exist that limit the search
space to a manageable size. Furthermore, in combination
with the development of more powerful computer systems,
this approach has shown to be viable for modelled systems
of a reasonable size. The main advantage of this approach
is that it is largely automatic, a property that agrees with
the usability philosophy of the SPEAR project.
3.3.2 Proof Construction
Attempts to avoid the exponential searches of attack con-
struction, and to extend analyses that involve arbitrarily
large numbers of participants and messages, has given rise
to the proof construction approach for the analysis of pro-
tocol failures [24, 5, 26]. It has the potential of being
as thorough as attack construction in proving possible at-
tacks, while avoiding exponential searches by replacing
them with theorems about these searches. This method is
completely general, with the disadvantage that it typically
requires significant human insight and guidance.
3.3.3 Hybrid Methods
The complementary nature of model checking and theorem
proving has led to attempts of combining the two above
methods in order to take full advantage of the strength of
respective approach. An example of a domain-independent
tool that does this is Berezin’s Symbolic Model Prover
(SyMP) [4]. The model checking aspect of the tool pro-
vides the high degree of automation and the theorem prov-
ing aspect provides rules for limiting the search space. The
challenge in this area is to guarantee termination of the
search, without compromising the (practical) completeness
of it.
4 The Strand Space Model
In this section we informally introduce the strand space
model. For a detailed formal account for the model, refer
to the original papers [33, 32, 34]. Firstly, the fundamen-
tals of the model and the basic terminology is introduced,
after which a simple example is given of how the model
can be used to describe a known protocol flaw. Finally, a
description of a modelled intruder using strands is given.
4.1 Basic Notions
The strand space approach is also based on the Dolev-
Yao intruder model. It is a graph-based method that is
used to prove properties of arbitrary combinations of pro-
tocols running at the same time. In Figure 3, P1, P2, P3
and P4 are principals. The actions of the principals are
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modelled as a number of sequential threads put in paral-
lel. These threads are are called strands. The nodes on
the strands are the actions that the principal performs, in
this case +a means that message a is sent, and −a means
that the same message is received. The sequence of ac-
tions along the strand is referred to as its trace. The nodes
on a single strand are causally related (denoted with the
⇒ operation). Between the strands there is in general the
sending and receiving of messages (→), so also between
a sending and a receiving node there is a causal relation-
ship. In the figure, P1 sends message a at a certain point,
and P3 expects message a at another point, so the strands
of the principals can be hooked together at these points.
A bundle consists of a number of strands (legitimate or
not) hooked together where one strand sends a message
and another strand receives that same message. A strand is
a linear structure, a sequence of one principal’s message
transmissions and receptions, whereas a bundle is a graph-
structured entity, representing the communication between
a number of strands.
P1 P2 P3 P4
+a ————→ −a +b
‖ ⇓ ⇓
‖ −c←— +c —–→−c
‖ ‖ ⇓ ⇓
‖ ‖ −d←—–+d
‖ ⇓ ⇓
‖ +e —→−e
⇓ ⇓
− f ←———— + f
⇓
+g
Figure 3: A bundle
A strand space is the set of all combinations of strands
(all possible bundles) reflecting the activity of honest prin-
cipals involved in a protocol, together with a number of
strands of the intruder. The nodes on all the strands to-
gether form a partial order when provided with the causal-
ity relation induced by the sequentiality on a single strand
(⇒) and the sending and receiving of messages (→). Typi-
cally, for a protocol to be correct, each bundle must contain
one strand for each of the legitimate principals participat-
ing in the session (i.e. are part of the bundle), all agree-
ing on the principals, nonces and session keys. Penetrator
strands or stray legitimate strands may also be part of a
bundle, even in a correct protocol, but they should not pre-
vent the legitimate participants from agreeing on the data
values, or from maintaining the secrecy of the chosen val-
ues.
A strand space models the assumption that some val-
ues occur only freshly by including only one strand origi-
nating that data by initially sending a message containing
it. Many strands, however, may combine with the originat-
ing strand by receiving the message and process its con-
tents further. A strand space also models the assumption
that some values are impossible for a penetrator to guess.
In fact, the space simply lacks any penetrator strand in
which a value is sent without it first having been received.
The model allows several instances of the same trace sim-
ply by introducing identical strands representing the same
trace being executed at different times.
4.2 An Attack Using Strands
We will illustrate the use of the model with an example
using the Needham-Schro¨der public key protocol:
A→ B : {Na,A}KB
B→ A : {Na,Nb}KA
A→ B : {Nb}KB
The protocol is described in the so-called standard no-
tation for security protocol descriptions. Each line defines
a message in the protocol. The first message is sent from
principal A to B, denoted by A → B, and the contents of
the message is defined after the colon. The message is a
concatenation of a nonce generated by principal A, Na, and
the identity of A. These two values are then encrypted with
the public key of B, KB.
A B
{Na,A}KB•——————–→•
‖ ‖
⇓ {Na,Nb}KA ⇓•←——————–•
‖ ‖
⇓ {Nb}KB ⇓•——————–→•
Figure 4: Needham-Schro¨der
In the strand space formalism, the protocol described
above is given in the bundle of Figure 4. The column below
A represents the strand consisting of the initiator’s activity
during the exchange, while the column under B represents
the strand of the responder’s activity. In this abbreviated
form of the Needham-Schro¨der public key protocol, we
assume that each principal has acquired the other’s pub-
lic key. The initiator generates a nonce, concatenates this
to his name and encrypts this with the intended respon-
dent’s public key. The respondent generates a nonce of his
own, sending it and the initiator’s nonce back, encrypted
with the initiator’s public key. He has this way answered
the initiator’s challenge by showing that he could read the
first message. Finally, the initiator returns the respondent’s
nonce encrypted with the respondent’s public key for the
same reason.
The intended result of the protocol is that the two prin-
cipals should end up sharing access to the values Na and
Nb, each associating these values with the other participant,
and no other party should be in possession of them. The
protocol might be used in a context where the two values
are hashed together to provide a shared symmetric key for
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an encrypted session. In fact, the protocol fails to achieve
this goal [15]. Figure 5 shows a bundle that provides a
counterexample (an attack against the protocol) and illus-
trates what can go wrong in the protocol. In the figure, the
penetrator P has two moments of activity, each represented
by a short strand. The initiator A intends to have a session
with P or some other principal whose key P controls. P
uses this opportunity to impersonate A to B.
A P B
{Na,A}KP•——————–→•
‖ ‖
‖ ⇓ {Na,A}KB‖ • ——————–→ •
‖ ‖
⇓ {Na,Nb}KA ⇓•←———————————————•
‖ ‖
‖ ‖
⇓ {Nb}KP P ‖•——————–→• ‖
‖ ‖
⇓ {Nb}KB ⇓• ——————–→ •
Figure 5: Needham-Schro¨der Infiltrated
The result of the attack is that B believes that A has
been authenticated. B also believes that the secret values
Na and Nb are only known by A and B just as in the in-
tended exchange from Figure 4, while in reality B is shar-
ing the values with the penetrator P. The protocol flaw can
(and was) eliminated by making B include its identity in
the second message ({Na,Nb,B}KA ). In Figure 5, A is ex-
pecting a message from P (the intended responder), but the
modified message reveals the identity of the real sender B,
and the attack fails.
4.3 The Intruder
The intruder’s capabilities are decided by two factors,
namely the set of keys known initially to the intruder, and a
set of penetrator strands that allow the intruder to generate
new messages from messages he intercepts. A penetrator
set consists of a set of keys KP. Typically, it contains all
public keys, all private keys held by the penetrator or his
accomplices, and all symmetric keys initially shared be-
tween the penetrator and principals playing by the protocol
rules. It may also contain ”lost keys” that became known
to the penetrator previously, perhaps because he succeeded
in some cryptanalysis.
The atomic actions available to the penetrator are en-
coded in a set of penetrator traces. They summarise the
ability to discard messages, generate well-known mes-
sages, piece messages together, and apply cryptographic
operations using keys that become available. A protocol
attack requires hooking together several of these atomic
actions.
The existing penetrator traces are:
M Text message: 〈+t〉 where t is a known component
F Flushing: 〈−g〉
T Tee (duplication): 〈−g,+g,+g〉
C Concatenation: 〈−g,−h,+gh〉
S Separation: 〈−gh,+g,+h〉
K Key: 〈+K〉 where K ∈ KP
E Encryption: 〈−K,−h,+{h}K〉
D Decryption: 〈−K−1,−{h}K ,+h〉
These capabilities of the intruder correspond directly
with the intruder capabilities of the Dolev-Yao model de-
scribed earlier. Figure 6 shows an example of how these
penetrator strands can be hooked together to provide the
behaviour of the first step in Figure 5. The open circles in
the figure (◦) show the two points with which the diagram
connects with the first nodes of A and B’s strands at the top
of Figure 5. The label above each strand shows which kind
of penetrator strand it is.
D
{Na,A}KP◦————-→•
‖
‖
K ‖
K−1P ⇓•————-→•
‖
‖ E
⇓ Na,A•————–→•
‖
‖
K ‖
KB ⇓•————–→•
‖
⇓ {Na,A}KB•————-→◦
Figure 6: Needham-Schro¨der: Penetrator’s first step
The strand space model is an appealing, clean model
of security protocols that brings together many techniques
that have been used in the field of security protocol ana-
lysis. The model considers the strand the basic unit as op-
posed to the state of the modelled principals, which makes
it more economical in both specification and analysis. Sev-
eral strand space solvers exist [30, 22, 8], and after a se-
lection process we have elected to use [8] as a solution
engine for SPEAR II. Current work is focused on integra-
tion of this engine, and in particular the handling of pa-
rameters which have to be defined to ensure appropriate
and maximum benefit from strand space attack considera-
tion. Once the strand space integration with SPEAR has
been completed, usability of strand space techniques will
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be enhanced and it will be possible to perform qualitative
comparison with other security analysis techniques more
easily.
5 Conclusion
We have presented the concept of multi-dimensional secu-
rity protocol engineering with the SPEAR II project as an
example thereof, and we have positioned our proposed re-
search concerning attack analysis in this context. A sum-
mary of the existing analysis methods was given, and fi-
nally, in order to complete the overview of our project, the
strand space formalism was presented.
The strand space model is a good start in implementing
an efficient automatic attack analysis tool, but other opti-
misation techniques must be considered in order to max-
imise the value of it. Furthermore, considering the context
of the tool, it is of importance to adapt it as far as possible
so that it complements the available inference analysis in
an optimal manner. Also, in accordance with the SPEAR
usability philosophy, the analysis must be made accessible
to a user without expert knowledge in the field of security
protocol engineering.
If these challenges are met, the analysis dimension will
be able to detect a larger set of protocol vulnerabilities than
is currently possible, which would be a valuable step to-
wards a powerful multi-dimensional cryptographic proto-
col engineering system.
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